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Abstract 
 
The paper analyses the political and economic determinants of the Portuguese political 
entities’ popularity, following Veiga (1998), the only published study on popularity 
functions for Portugal. After a description of the recent evolution and structure of the 
Portuguese political system, popularity functions are estimated for the Assembly, 
Government, Prime Minister, and President, using OLS, ARIMAX and SUR with AR 
components. Strong evidence is found in favor of the responsibility hypothesis, with 
inflation and, especially, unemployment affecting popularity levels. Results support the 
existence of popularity erosion over consecutive terms and of honeymoon effects. 
Ideological issues or support in parliament do not seem to be taken into account in the 
evaluations of incumbents’ economic performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Although the international literature on he influence of economic conditions on the 
popularity of politicians and electoral results is extensive and started several years ago,1 
there is, to our knowledge, only one published paper about the Portuguese case. Veiga 
(1998) analyzed whether economic cond tions influenced the popularity of the four main 
Portuguese political entities, during 10 years of social democratic governments, under the 
leadership of Cavaco Silva (1986-95). Her results indicate that: (1) popularity polls for the 
Prime Minister and Government are better explained by economic conditions than similar 
polls for the Parliament and the President; (2) unemployment is a significant variable 
determining popularity while inflation is not; (3) honeymoon effects are significant; and, 
(4) popularity deteriorates over consecutive terms. 
The period after 1995 has not yet been investigated. The socialist party, under the 
leadership of António Guterres, won the elections held in October 1995. The resulting 
socialist minority government remained in office during the entire term and won a second 
election on October 1999, obtaining exactly 50% of the seats in Parliament. Therefore, this 
is the perfect timing to investigate whether the main determinants of popularity remained 
the same. We start by describing the evolution and structure of the Portuguese political 
system in order to provide some background to the analyses performed. The following 
section presents the data set used in the paper. The empirical work is reported in section 5. 
We started by replicating Veiga’s (1998) specification and then performed some fine-
tuning of the econometric work. Finally, the conclusions are discussed along with 
directions for future research. 
                                         
1 Seminal papers are Goodhart and Bansali (1970), Kramer (1971) and Mueller (1971). See Nannestad and 
Paldam (1994) for a survey on the topic. 
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2. The Portuguese political system since April 25, 19742 
 In a bloodless coup on April 25, 1974, the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento 
das Forças Armadas – MFA), a group of mainly left-wing military officers, seized power 
and put an end to the so-called New State (Estado Novo), an authoritarian regime that 
lasted 48 years. In the two following years, the country was run by the Junta of National 
Salvation (replaced by the Council of the Revolution on March 1975), there were six 
temporary governments and two presidents, independence was given to the African 
Overseas Territories, two military uprisings took place (on March and November, 1975), 
and elections for the Constituent Assembly, that would prepare and approve a new 
constitution, were held on April 1975. 
 The new constitution came into effect on April 25, 1976, and elections for th  
Assembly of the Republic, the Portuguese unicameral parliament, were held on the same 
day. Two months later, on June 27, General Ramalho Eanes, an independent military 
candidate, was elected President of the Republic. He then invested a minority governme t 
led by Mário Soares, the leader of the socialist party, on July 16. Eleven years of great 
political instability followed, during which about ten minority and coalition governments 
came short of completing their terms and five legislative elections took place. After two 
terms of Ramalho Eanes as President of the Republic, Mário Soares won the second runoff  
of the most disputed presidential election so far (on February 16, 1986), to become the first 
civilian head of state in 60 years. 
On July 19, 1987, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) managed to become the first 
political party in the thirteen years since the fall of dictatorship to win an absolute majority 
of seats in parliament. Cavaco Silva, who had led a minority government in the two 
                                         
2 For a more complete description of the evolution and structure of the Portuguese political system, see 
several issues of Arthur Banks’ Political Handbook of the World and the World Europa Yearbook. 
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previous years, was able to form an all-PSD government, and be the first prime minister 
since 1974 to complete his term. He was then reelected by an overall majority of the 
electorate on October 1991, ruling the country for another four years. 
 
Table 1. Legislative el ctions and parties in government 
Dates Winning party Share in Parliament Prime Minister Form of government 
     April 25, 1976 
December 2, 1979 
October 5, 1980 
April 25, 1983 
October 5, 1985 
July 19, 1987 
October 6, 1991 
October 1, 1995 
October 10, 1999 
PS 
AD=PSD+CDS+PPM 
AD=PSD+CDS+PPM 
PS 
PSD 
PSD 
PSD 
PS 
PS 
43% 
51% 
54% 
40% 
34% 
59% 
58% 
48% 
50% 
Mário Soares 
Sá Carneiro 
Sá Carneiro 
Mário Soares 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
António Guterres 
António Guterres 
One party, minority 
Coalition 
Coalition 
Coalition (PS+PSD) 
One party, minority 
One party 
One party 
One party, minority 
One party 
Note: PS – Socialist Party (center left); PSD – ocial Democratic Party (center right); CDS – Social 
Democratic Center (right), PPM – Monarchic Popular Party (right, monarchic). 
 
Economic recession and scandals involving members of government led to a 
growing erosion of the government’s popularity, which prompted Cavaco Silva to abandon 
the leadership of PSD on January 1995, and prepare his bid for the presidency. The 
Socialist Party (PS) won the October 1995 elections, coming very close to an overall 
majority in Parliament (112 of a total of 230 deputies), and António Guterres became 
prime minister. Three months later, Jorge Sampaio, former mayor of Lisbon and candidate 
of the socialist party, won the presidential elections against Cavaco Silva. 
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For the first time since 1974, a minority government managed to stay in power for 
the entire term. The last legislative elections took place on October 10, 1999, and were 
again won by the socialists, who got exactly half of the seats in parliament. Although they 
do not have an overall majority, they cannot be turned down by a no-confidence v te, 
which means that they are in a good position to stay in power until the 2003 elections. 
 
Table 2. Presidential elections 
Dates President (Major opponent) 
  June 27, 1976 
December 10, 1980 
January 26 and February 16, 1986 
January 13, 1991 
January 14, 1996 
General Ramalho Eanes (Otelo S. de Carvalho) 
General Ramalho Eanes (Soares Carneiro) 
Mário Soares (Freitas do Amaral) 
Mário Soares (Basílio Horta) 
Jorge Sampaio (Cavaco Silva) 
 
 Taking the evolution of the political system into account we anticipate a change in 
the way voters held the political entities responsible for economic conditions before 1995 
(period analyzed by Veiga, 1998) and the way they do it afterwards. Recall that the 
October 1995 elections led to a change from a center-right majo ity government to a center 
left minority government.  
 
3. Structure of the Portuguese political system 
 Since the constitutional revision of 1982 that eliminated the Council of the 
Revolution, the organs of sovereignty are the President of the Republic, the Assembly of 
the Republic, the Government, and the Courts. 
 The President of the Republic is elected by direct and secret universal adult 
suffrage for a five-y ar term, using a majoritarian system with a second round runoff 
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between the two main contenders if none of them got more than 50% of the votes in the 
first round. Presidential candidates must be Portuguese citizens, 35 or older, who can either 
run as independents or be the appointed candidate of a political party. No President can 
serve for more than two consecutive terms. 
The main duties of the President are: to serve as the head of State and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; to set the dates of legislative elections after 
consulting the parties; to appoint the prime minister and the members of the government 
suggested by the latter; to dissolve the parliament and call for anticipated elections; to 
promulgate and have published laws, decree-laws and regulations; to veto laws and decrees 
or send them for appreciation by the Constitutional Tribunal. 
The Assembly of the Republic is the Portuguese unicameral parliament, currently 
composed of 230 deputies elected for a period of four years by direct and secret universal 
adult suffrage, using a proportional electoral system. The duties of the Assembly include, 
among others: enacting legislation in all areas except those reserved to the Govenment; 
approving amendments to the Constitution; approving the government’s general budget 
and plan of activities; passing motions of confidence or censure to the government; and 
appointing ten of the thirteen members of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
 The Government formulates the general policy of the country and is the highest 
organ of public administration. It therefore has political, legislative, and executive powers. 
Its legislative power consists of proposing laws to the Assembly and on issuing decrees.
The executive power concerns the execution of the general plans of activities and budgets 
of the State. The Government is responsible to both the President, who can dismiss it, and 
to the Assembly of the Republic, that must approve its plans and budgets, and may dismiss 
it by passing a censure motion (a no-confidence vote). 
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The Government comprises the Prime Minister, generally the leader of the most 
voted party in the last elections, the Ministers, the Secretaries of State, and the Under-
Secretaries of State. The Prime Minister is appointed or dismissed by the President after 
consulting the political parties and having in mind the election results. The other members 
of government are appointed by the President at the proposal of the Prime Minister. 
 Finally, the courts are organs of sovereignty with competence to administer justice 
in the name of the people. They are independent of the other organs and subject only to 
law. Their decisions are binding on all public and private institutions and prevail over the
decisions of all other authorities. 
 Since the Government is responsible for the conduct of economic policy, we expect 
it to be the organ of sovereignty whose popularity depends the most of the performance of 
the Portuguese economy. Next comes the Prime Minister, who leads the government and is 
its most visible member. Since the Assembly is usually dominated by the party in 
government and approves the laws, plans, and budgets proposed by the latter, it may also 
be held responsible for the performance of the conomy. Finally, the President can only 
veto the laws or decrees proposed by the government or dismiss it. Thus, we expect the 
popularity of the President to be the least affected by economic performance. 
Taking into account the increasing influence of the European Union on domestic 
policies, especially on monetary issues, we expect the way voters hold national political 
entities responsible for economic conditions to vary over time. 
 
4. The data 
The period analyzed in this paper goes from May 1986 to October 1999 covering 
three terms of social democratic governments and a term of a socialist government. 
Popularity data was collected from a weekly national journal called Expresso. 
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Euroexpansão conducts the polls on a monthly basis, by telephone intervi ws to a 
representative sample of about 600 Portuguese. Interviewed individuals classify the 
performance of the Prime Minister, the Government, the Assembly of the Republic, and 
the President of the Republic as very good (VG), fairly good (FG) or bad (B). Given these 
series, a popularity index, POPt was calculated for each of the four entities as a weighted 
sum of the three possible answers. Specifically, POPt=(2*VGt+FGt)/2.3 Its values over 
time for the political entities studied are shown in Figure 1.
 
Figure 1. Popularity index 
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Note: Vertical hatched lines represent election dates. 
                                         
3 Note that the weighted sum of VGt and FGt is divided by two instead of three, as in Veiga (1998). This 
forces the index to be comprised between 0 and 100. 
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Monthly unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted and standardized, were collected 
from OECD-Main Economic Indicators. Inflation rates, nominal exchange rates, real 
effective exchange rates, and the industrial production index were collected from I.M.F. – 
International Financial Statistics. 
 
5. Empirical Work 
Popularity functions explain poll support for incumbent politicians by economic 
and political variables. Economic variables are included to test the responsibility 
hypothesis, according to which voters hold politicians responsible for economic conditions. 
Several economic series have been used in previous studies of popularity functions, but 
unemployment and inflation are the most commonly used, and also the ones that generate 
stronger results. The underlying idea is that the evolution of these series affects the utility 
of voters, who therefore, punish (reward) politicians for increasing (decreasing) 
unemployment or inflation.4 The influence of political factors is typically taken into 
account by including variables to control for the erosion of popularity ver time n office, 
honeymoon effects of the newly elected politician with the electorate immediately after an 
election and dummy variables to control for personality factors or special events. 
The popularity functions we estimate are of the following form: 
(1) POPt = a + b(L)POPt-1 + fPt + hHt  + diTit + jE(xt) + ut  
The dependent variable, POP is the popularity index for each of the four political entities. 
The underlying idea is that popularity levels depend on previous levels of popularity, 
                                         
4 Whether voters are forward-looking or backward-looking in their vote decisions will not be an issue for the 
moment. For simplicity, we assume expectations to be based on competence revealed by politicians in the 
past. Nannestad and Paldam (1994) state on page 238: “voting is retrospective; but the relevant expectations 
are very static. Forward looking expectations consequently work equally well.” 
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(L)POP, the Prime Minister or President in office, P, honeymoon effects, H, the number of 
terms in office, Ti, and overall economic performance, E(x). 
Portugal had two Prime Ministers and two Presidents during the time period 
considered here. It is possible that the popularity levels they enjoyed depended partly of 
their personal characteristics. In order to account for personal effects on the popularity of 
the political entities considered in the present paper, two dummy variables were included 
in the set of explanatory variables. The first, GUTERRES, takes the value of one when 
António Guterres is the Prime Minister, and zero otherwise. It was included in the 
estimations for the Prime Minister, Government, and Assembly. The second, SAMPAIO, 
takes the value of one when Jorge Sampaio is the President of the Republic, and zero 
otherwise. It was included in the estimations of the President’s popularity.  
Honeymoon effects are captured by a discrete variable, H, that takes the value of 
six in the first month of each term, declining to one in he sixth month, and taking the value 
of zero thereafter. The hypothesis being investigated is that politicians have higher 
popularity indexes during the first months of their administration. Since longer time in 
office is usually associated with erosion of popularity, we expect negative coefficients for 
the dummy variables representing the second and the third terms in office, when the 
dummy for the first term is not included in the estimation. 
In our basic specification, overall economic performance is captured by the rates of 
inflation and unemployment. We also tested for the effects of the percentage changes of 
the industrial production index, the nominal exchange rate, and the real effective exchange 
rate. The economic variables were always lagged becaus  economic data is released with a 
time lag, in some cases of a few months, making it impossible for the interviewed people 
to know their current values. 
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 We proceeded by estimating the model using the OLS method. Then, the time 
series properties of the series were more properly taken into account applying the Box-
Jenkins methodology for model selection, and an ARIMAX model was estimated. Because 
the popularity of the four entities analyzed is likely to be influenced by common factors, 
we estimated a system of popularity functions for the four entities by seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR). 
 
5.1. OLS results 
 Results of OLS estimations are shown in Table 3. The first lag of the popularity 
index is always highly statistically significant and a second l g is also significant in the 
estimations for the Government and President. The coefficient associated with the dummy 
variable GUTERRES/SAMPAIO has a negative sign in the four estimations. It is 
statistically significant in the estimations for the Prime Minister and Government, showing 
that the popularity of these two entities tended to be smaller when António Guterres was 
Prime Minister (a socialist government was in office). The same cannot be said about the 
Assembly, whose popularity does not seem to depend on the Prime Minister or the 
ideology of the government in office. With respect to the President’s popularity, results 
suggest that it was not affected by the replacement of Mário Soares by Jorge Sampaio on 
January 1996. 
 The coefficients associated with the dummy variables that represent the second and 
the third terms in office (T2 and T3, respectively) have a negative sign in all estimations, as 
expected. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant in all but one occasion: T2 
is not significant in the estimation for the Assembly. But, T3 is highly significant in the 
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same estimation, meaning that there is still evidence in favor of the hypothesis that 
consecutive terms in office lead to the erosion of popularity.5 
 
Table 3: OLS Results 
      Assembly of the 
Republic 
Government Prime Minister President 
     
     C 35.31269 
(7.05)*** 
23.38360 
(4.54)*** 
30.05654 
(5.53)*** 
37.74491 
(3.44)*** 
     POP(-1) 0.429018 
(5.53)*** 
0.555430 
(6.16)*** 
0.712621 
(13.73)*** 
0.393488 
(4.55)*** 
     POP(-2)  0.171121 
(1.86)* 
 0.202317 
(2.21)** 
     GUTERRES 
SAMPAIO 
-0.594510 
(-0.61) 
-2.938192 
(-2.84)*** 
-3.657721 
(-3.02)*** 
-0.819072 
(-0.85) 
     T2 -0.518927 
(-0.47) 
-3.509206 
(-2.59)** 
-5.034330 
(-3.65)*** 
-2.681201 
(-2.26)** 
     T3 -3.329814 
(-3.03)*** 
-5.187273 
(-3.54)*** 
-7.324925 
(-4.69)** 
 
     H 1.289120 
(3.41)*** 
0.679571 
(2.44)** 
1.295563 
(3.00)*** 
0.137430 
(0.50) 
     AvInflation(-2) -1.654305 
(-1.89)* 
-1.835005 
(-1.82)* 
-1.826062 
(-1.44) 
0.363067 
(0.31) 
     UnempRate (-1) -0.718405 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.870739 
(-2.38)** 
-1.164999 
(-2.95)*** 
-0.861265 
(-2.01)** 
     
     Adjusted R-squared 0.672631 0.822103 0.864471 0.650014 
Schwarz criterion 4.817269 5.206359 5.417069 5.368770 
F-statistic 40.91905 77.82819 125.8362 36.55327 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.892032 1.926127 1.931813 2.077864 
     
Notes: - the dependent variable is the popularity of the political entity shown in the column heading; 
- t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance. 
 
 Results support the existence of honeymoon effects for all entities except the 
President. That is, the Assembly, the Government and the Prime Minister had higher levels 
of popularity at the beginning of their terms (during the first six months in office). 
                                         
5 In the case of the Assembly, “consecutive terms in office” means that the same party dominated the 
parliament over consecutive terms. 
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 There is weak evidence that higher average inflation6 leads t  lower popularity. 
This variable is only marginally statistically significant for the Assembly and Government 
(at the 10% level), and is not statistically significant for the Prime Minister and President 
(and the coefficient has the wrong sign for the latter). Given his very small influence over 
economic policy, it is not surprising that the President’s popularity is not affected by 
inflation. Much more surprising is the result for the Prime Minister, as we would expect 
him to be penalized by inflation more or less in the same manner as the Government he 
leads. 
 Results reinforce Veiga’s (1998) finding that higher rates of unemployment 
decrease the popularity of the political entities considered. The estimated coefficients have 
a negative sign, as expected, and are statistically significant in all estimations. Regarding 
the President, results are abit surprising given his small influence on economic policy. We 
would expect his popularity to be the least affected or even unaffected by economic 
conditions. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron7 tests were performed in order to 
check whether the series are stationary. This is very important, since the classical OLS 
model necessitates that the series are stationary and the errors have a zero mean and finite 
variance. Thus, in the presence on nonstationary variables, there might be what Granger 
and Newbold (1974) called a “spurious regression”, meaning that OLS results are not 
reliable. Results of ADF and Phillips-Perron tests, not shown here,8 indicate that the 
popularity indexes, the monthly inflation rate, and the unemployment rate are stationary.  
                                         
6 The variable used in the estimations of Table 3 to account for the effects of inflation on popularity levels is 
the second lag of the four-month moving average of monthly inflation:  
AvInflationt=(Inft+Inft-1+Inft-2+Inft-3)/4. 
7 See Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips and Perron (1988). 
8 An appendix including all results discussed but not shown in the present paper is available from the authors 
upon request. 
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Thus, all continuous variables used in the estimations of Table 3 are stationary, 
meaning that our results are not spurious. As cointegration is not a problem either, there is 
no need to estimate an error correction model (see Engel and Granger, 1987). Concerning 
other economic variables used in alternative estimations, the monthly percentage changes 
of the industrial production index, of the end-of-perio  nominal exchange rate, and of the 
real effective exchange rate are also stationary. 
Recursive Least Squares9 was used to evaluate the stability of the model over 
time10 in several ways. We started by simply checking whether the recursive residuals 
tended to lie within the ±2 standard errors bands. Then, one-step-ahead and n-step-ahead 
forecast tests11 were performed. All these tests revealed that the parameters of all four 
estimations of Table 3 are quite stable. 
We also estimated a considerable number of robustness tests not reported here. 
First, using alternative definitions of the popularity index12, POPt (the dependent variable). 
Second, in order to test whether popularity deteriorates smoothly with time in office and 
not just over consecutive terms, a variable measuring time in office (in months) was also 
included in the model. Third, other definitions of the honeymoon effects dummy, H, were 
used.13 Fourth, using alternative definitions of average inflation.14 Fi th, i cluding a 
                                         
9 This procedure estimates an equation repeatedly, using increasing subsets of the sample data. The first 
estimation of the coefficient vector uses the number of observations that is strictly necessary to run the 
model. Then, the next estimation uses one more observation, and this process is repeated until the entire 
sample is used. At each step, a one-step-ahead forecast of the dependent variable can be performed using the 
last estimate of the parameter vector. The errors resulting from the series of predictions are the recursive 
residuals, which are independently and normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance if the 
model is valid. 
10 Structural breaks at election dates indicated by Chow tests are accounted for in our model by the dummy 
variables for the terms in office (T2 and T3) and for the personal effects (GUTERRES/SAMPAIO). 
11 The n-step-ahead forecast test uses the recursive calculations to perform Chow Forecast tests for all 
feasible time periods, adding one observation at a time. 
12 POPt=VGt+FGt and POPt=VGt. Where VGt and FGt are the percentage of the interviewed people 
classifying the performance of a political entity as Very Good or Fairly Good, respectively, at time t. 
13 Using dummy variables that took the value of one in the first 6, 5, 4 or 3 months of an administration, and 
zero afterwards. 
14 A moving average of the last five or six values of monthly inflation, or just the second lag of monthly 
inflation. 
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dummy variable that takes the value of one after April 1992, when the Escudo joined the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System, and zero otherwise.15 
Finally, adding the monthly percentage change of the industrial production index, of the 
nominal exchange rate, and of the real effective exchange rate, either jointly or one at a 
time. None of these changed results significantly. 
 The analysis performed above assumes that the electorate holds the political entities 
responsible for higher inflation or unemployment in a way that is independent of the 
entities’ political orientation. Although the dummy variable GUTERRES also represents 
the left,16 a positive coefficient would only mean that the left-wing oriented political 
entities tended to be more popular in general. Swank (1993) introduced partisan 
considerations into popularity functions. Following Hibbs (1977), he assumed t at left-
wing parties care more about unemployment and economic growth than right-wing parties, 
which are more concerned with inflation. Therefore, during recessions the demand for 
expansionary policies increases, making left-wing proposals more attractive, and the 
reverse occurs during expansions. Assuming that politicians and voters behave optimally, 
left-wing parties lose support when inflation rises, unemployment falls or economic growth 
rises, and vice-v rsa for right-wing parties. 
We tested this hypothesis by adding two variables to the model. They the product 
of average inflation or the unemployment rate by a dummy variable, LEFT, that takes the 
value of one when the political entity in office is left-wing oriented, and zero otherwise. A 
positive coefficient was expected for the product of the UnempRate(-1) and LEFT, as the 
left gains support when unemployment rises, and a negative coefficient was expected for 
                                         
15 The entrance of the Portuguese Escudo to the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary 
System placed additional constraints on monetary policy which could have affected the way p ople held the 
political entities responsible for economic outcomes. 
16 In our sample, the socialist party is in power when António Guterres is Prime Minister (GUTERRES=1) 
and the social democrats rule when he is not (GUTERRES=0). 
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the product of AvInflation(-2) and LEFT, as the left loses support when inflation rises. 
These two variables were not statistically significant for any of the political entities 
considered, meaning that we did not find support for Swank’s partisan theory. 
 According to Anderson (2000) and Powell and Witten (1993), evaluations of the 
political entities’ performance should take into account their power and responsibility over 
economic policy. That is, political entities with greater authority to set economic policy 
should be those most accountable for economic outcomes. Then, governments that are not 
supported by a majority of seats in parliament should be less accountable than those that are, 
since lapses in performance can be blamed on actions taken by the opposition. 
 We tested the hypothesis that the Assembly, the Government, and the Prime 
Minister are less accountable for economic outcomes when the party in power does not 
have a majority of seats in the parliament by adding the interactions of inflation and 
unemployment with a dummy variable that takes the value of one when no party has a 
majority of seats in the Assembly of the Republic17, and zero otherwise. Results did not 
support this hypothesis, meaning that the Portuguese held the Assembly, Government and 
prime Minister equally responsible for economic outcomes regardless of whether a single
party had a majority of seats in parliament or not. 
 
5.2. ARIMAX results 
The high persistence and autocorrelation of popularity indexes is usually taken into 
account by including lags of the dependent variable in the estimations, as we did in Table 
3. But, the time series structure of a series can be more correctly taken into account by 
applying the Box-Jenkins (1976) methodology for model selection. 
                                         
17 That happend during the first terms of Cavaco Silva (October 1985 to October 1987) and António 
Guterres (October 1995 to October 1999) as prime Minister, which correspond to the cases in which the 
dummy variable T1 is equal to one. The new variables are then: (T1*AvInflation(-2)), and (T1*UnempRate). 
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Thus, the next step was to find out if the popularity indexes of our four political 
entities followed an ARIMA process. Since Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests show 
evidence of stationarity for the popularity indexes, these can only follow ARMA processes. 
Autocorrelations and partial correlations of those series suggest autoregressive processes 
for all indexes: AR(2) for the Assembly, Government and President; and an AR(1) for the 
Prime Minister. 
These results contrast with the predictions of the rational expectation models tested 
by Neck and Karbuz (1997): the “permanent benefits model” which follows an 
ARIMA(0,1,1); and the “stock of goodwill” model, better characterized by an 
ARIMA(1,0,1). Our results, as well as theirs, indicate that popularity tends to follow a time 
series process that is different from those predicted by rational expectations models. Thus, 
as previously stated, voters seem to have mainly retrospective expectations and be 
backward-looking. 
Like Neck and Karbuz (1997), we also estimate an ARIMA model that incorporates 
the explanatory variables used in our OLS estimations of Table 3. The results of this 
ARIMAX model, which in our case has only autoregressive (AR) components, are shown 
in Table 4. These are somewhat similar to those of OLS estimations. The major differences 
concern the t-statistics, which generally increase, and the fact that the average inflation rate 
becomes highly statistically significant for the Prime Minister and more significant than 
before for the Government. Now, results concerning the effects of inflation on popularity 
are more in line with our expectations. The most affected entities are the Prime Minister 
and Government, followed by the Assembly, and the President’s popularity does not seem 
to be affected by inflation. Conclusions regarding other variables remain the same. 
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Table 4: ARIMAX Models Results 
      Assembly of the 
Republic 
Government Prime Minister President 
     
C 62.60717 
(11.05)*** 
84.04746 
(8.70)*** 
104.4377 
(10.35)*** 
93.04246 
(21.17)*** 
     GUTERRES 
SAMPAIO 
-0.467611 
(-0.20) 
-10.29520 
(-3.10)*** 
-11.20312 
(-2.76)*** 
-2.667976 
(-1.50) 
     T2 -1.862641 
(-0.65) 
-15.25917 
(-3.67)*** 
-19.55216 
(-4.27)*** 
-5.753877 
(-3.56)*** 
     T3 -5.261721 
(-2.08)** 
-17.87214 
(-4.83)*** 
-24.83087 
(-6.46)*** 
 
     H 0.915170 
(2.62)*** 
1.083333 
(2.22)** 
1.833314 
(3.34)*** 
0.421128 
(0.99) 
     AvInflation(-2) -1.815724 
(-1.73)* 
-3.131551 
(-2.42)** 
-3.913605 
(-3.07)*** 
0.471669 
(0.31) 
     UnempRate (-1) -1.491126 
(-2.19)** 
-3.204127 
(-2.49)** 
-4.036013 
(-3.00)*** 
-2.052871 
(-3.05)*** 
     AR(1) 0.526017 
(5.27)*** 
0.592406 
(6.80)*** 
0.805245 
(15.98)*** 
0.362911 
(4.11)*** 
     AR(2) 0.122465 
(1.34) 
0.207808 
(2.09)** 
 0.182484 
(2.27)** 
     
     Adjusted R-squared 0.675236 0.824381 0.861218 0.639055 
Schwarz criterion 4.740956 5.195406 5.446699 5.389270 
F-statistic 35.04629 77.86647 121.5653 34.38670 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.184291 2.016705 2.017707 2.067529 
     
Notes: - the dependent variable is the popularity of the political entity shown in the column heading; 
- t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rej cted: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance. 
 
 
 As in Neck and Karbuz (1997), the fact that the coefficients on the explanatory 
variables are statistically significant in the ARIMAX models presents further evidence 
against the rational expectations models referred to above. 
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5.3. SUR results 
Because the popularity of the four political entities analyzed may be influenced by 
common factors, and the residuals of the estimations may be correlated, we estimated the 
four equations as a system, using the seemingly unrelated regressions technique, 
commonly known as SUR (see Zellner, 1962). 
Results, shown in Table 5, are very similar to those of the ARIMAX models. The 
major difference is that the dummy variable SAMPAIO is now statistically significant. The 
negative sign of the coefficient suggests that Jorge Sampaio is less popular than Mário 
Soares was. The estimated coefficients for average inflation and the unemployment rate are 
higher than before, implying a greater effect of these economic variables on popularity. 
The political entities whose popularity is most affected by economic events are, again, the 
Prime Minister and the Government. These results are in accordance with our expectations, 
as these are the political entities that have greater influence over economic policy. 
The residual correlation matrix at the bottom of Table 5 indicates that there is 
considerable correlation between the error terms of the estimations for the Prime Minister, 
Government and Assembly of the Republic. The correlations of these equations’ residuals 
with that of the President are smaller but not negligible. Thus, we can safely argue that by 
estimating the equation as a system, by SUR, a considerable gain in the efficiency of the 
model was attained. 
In order to find out if voters hold the political entities equally responsible for 
economic performance, we performed several tests for the equality of coefficients 
associated with the economic variables for the different polit cal entities. The Wald tests 
performed reject the hypotheses of equal coefficients for the unemployment rate but not for 
inflation. This means that Portuguese voters do not hold the political entities here 
considered equally responsible for economic outces. 
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Table 5: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) with AR components 
     
 Assembly of the 
Republic 
Government Prime Minister President 
     
C 64.18052 
(21.61)*** 
77.59970 
(16.98)*** 
103.8944 
(18.63)*** 
97.71104 
(36.20)*** 
     GUTERRES 
SAMPAIO 
-1.129774 
(-0.91) 
-10.18880 
(-5.37)*** 
-14.57263 
(-6.29)*** 
-2.919203 
(-2.58)** 
     T2 -2.954979 
(-2.34)** 
-11.87110 
(-6.09)*** 
-18.03472 
(-7.56)*** 
-6.914394 
(-8.34)*** 
     T3 -6.216360 
(-5.02)*** 
-17.41050 
(-9.11)*** 
-24.52987 
(-10.50)*** 
 
     H 1.433098 
(6.85)*** 
2.602487 
(8.71)*** 
2.513298 
(7.39)*** 
0.461279 
(1.59) 
     AvInflation(-2) -2.028404 
(-1.76)* 
-4.150413 
(-2.34)** 
-5.817856 
(-2.69)*** 
-1.543728 
(-1.14) 
     UnempRate (-1) -1.544772 
(-5.03)*** 
-2.076668 
(-4.41)*** 
-3.737978 
(-6.51)*** 
-2.528603 
(-7.91)*** 
     
    AR structure AR(2) AR(2) AR(1) AR(2) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.507541 0.573558 0.576995 0.504328 
S.E. of regression 3.110415 4.830264 5.807384 3.730016 
     
     
Residual Correlation Matrix     
     Assembly 1.00 0.74 0.64 0.31 
Government 0.74 1.00 0.88 0.28 
Prime Minister 0.64 0.88 1.00 0.26 
President 0.31 0.28 0.26 1.00 
     
Notes: - the dependent variable is the popularity of the political entity shown in the column heading; 
- t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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6. Conclusions 
 We have gathered evidence consistent with the responsibility hypothesis: 
Portuguese voters hold the four political entities under investigation responsible fo  
economic outcomes, especially unemployment. We also found much stronger evidence that 
Portuguese voters hold incumbents responsible for inflation than in Veiga (1998). Results 
also indicate that voters hold social democratic and socialist governmen s equally 
responsible for economic conditions, meaning that our data does not support Swank’s 
(1993) partisan hypothesis. Furthermore, the effect of economic outcomes on popularity 
does not seem to be affected by whether the party in power has a majrity of e ts in the 
Assembly of the Republic or not. This contradicts the hypothesis of Anderson 
(forthcoming) and Powell and Witten (1993) that minority governments should be less 
accountable for economic outcomes than majority ones. 
 Our data suggests the existence of honeymoon effects and of popularity 
depreciation over consecutive terms in office. The popularity of the Government and the 
Prime Minister tended to be smaller when António Guterres was Prime Minister (a 
socialist government was in office), while the popularity of the Assembly is not affected by 
this personality effect. Concerning the President, there is some evidence that Jorge 
Sampaio is less popular than Mário Soares was. 
 Future research on the political economic process of the country should include the 
analysis of the series on vote intentions and on the popularity of the leaders of the parties 
forming the opposition, which are also published monthly in Expresso. It would also be 
interesting to investigate what the Portuguese know about the evolution of the economy, in 
the lines of Nannestad and Paldam (2000), since the responsibility hypothesis assumes that 
voters know how the economy evolves. 
 21
References 
Anderson, Christopher J. (2000). Economic Voting and Political Context, Elect ral Studies 
(forthcoming). 
Banks, Arthur, ed., Political Handbook of the World, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 
various issues. 
Dickey, D.A. and Fuller, W.A. (1979). Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive 
time series with a unit root, Journal of the American Statistical Association 74: 427-
431. 
Engle, Robert F. and Granger, Clive W.J. (1987). Cointegration and Error-Correction: 
Representation, Estimation, and Testing, Econometrica 55: 251-276. 
Goodhart, C.A.E. and Bhansali, R.J. (1970). Political economy, Political Studies 18: 43-
106. 
Granger, Clive and Newbold, Peter (1974). Spurious Regressions in Econometrics, Journal 
of Econometrics 2: 111-120. 
Hibbs, Douglas A. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. A erican Political 
Science Review 71: 1467-1487. 
Kramer, G.H. (1971). Short-term fluctuations in US voting behavior, 1896-1964, American 
Political Science Review 65:131-143. 
Mueller, J.E. (1970). Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson, American Political 
Science Review 64:18-23. 
Nannestad, P. and Paldam, M. (1994). The VP-function: a survey of the literature on vote 
and popularity functions after 25 years, Public Choice 79: 213-245. 
Nannestad, P. and Paldam, M. (2000). What do voters know about the economy? A study 
of Danish data, 1990-1 93, Electoral Studies (forthcoming). 
 22
Neck, Reinhard & Karbuz, Sohbet (1997). Econometric estimations of the popularity 
functions: A case study for Austria, Public Choice 91: 57-88. 
Phillips, Peter and Perron, Pierre (1988). Testing for a Unit Root in Time Ser es 
Regression. Biometrica, 75(June): 335- 46. 
Powell, G. B., Jr., and Whitten, G. (1993), “A Cross-national Analysis of Economic 
Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context,” American Journal of Political 
Science, 37: 391-414. 
Swank, O. H. (1993). Popularity Functions Based on Partisan Theory, Public Choice 75: 
339-356. 
Veiga, Linda Gonçalves (1998). Popularity Functions for the Portuguese Prime Minister, 
Government, Parliament and President, European Journal of Political Research 33: 
347-361. 
Zelner, A. (1962). An efficient method of estimating seemingly unrelated regressions and 
tests for aggregation bias, Journal of American Statistical Association 57: 348-368. 
World Europa Yearbook, Europa Publications, London, several issues. 
